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Abstract
Innovation economics is usually neglecting the psychological tradition of creativity
research. Our study is an attempt to experimentally collect behavioral data revealing
in how far personality characteristics like creativity, analytical skills and personality
traits on the one hand and innovative capability, the topic of innovation economics,
on the other hand are interrelated. We find that participants’ performance in in-
novation games is related to their creativity, risk tolerance and self-control. Other
personality traits such as participants’ anxiety, independence, tough-mindedness,
analytical skills and extraversion at best play a minor role.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores special game experiments, used to measure individual capability
to “innovate” in the lab, and analysis how creativity, analytical skills and personality
traits are correlated with interactive innovation behavior in such games. Though
the concept of capability has become increasingly prominent in the management
research of recent years it is notoriously hard to find adequate operationalizations
for it. Since typically such capabilities may depend on the strategic context reliance
on personality variables alone, the standard approach in creativity research, seems
insufficient. The capability to innovate is a case in point. Whether innovation success
of individuals may be expected or not does not only depend on their personality but
also on the market context in which they are acting. Though context may matter as
much as individual traits in explaining individual innovation-game behavior, the way
an individual responds to similar contexts may as well be an individual characteristic
or character trait.
Assuming that context can be captured in a general and rather abstract way by
“innovation games”, adapted from the Industrial Organization literature (see, e.g.,
Malerba 2007, Vives 2008) we elicit individual context dependency or, more specifi-
cally, individual responses to innovation challenges via innovation-game experiments.
Hopefully the experimental innovation games help to classify context dependency
so that different individual responses to different contexts may be used along with
personality traits to assess individual capabilities and proclivities to innovate.
Our empirical-experimental approach is no substitute for field research but avoids
some of its problems, e.g., by allowing for better control in data elicitation.1 How-
ever, our study has several disadvantages - an obvious one being that it targets
undergraduate students rather than actual entrepreneurs and innovators and that it
abstracts from the social skills of successful innovators.
1 We decided to explore the topic experimentally because studies using questionnaire data on
firms’ innovative activities tend to suffer from two main shortcomings: (i) they do not provide
information on individual capabilities and characteristics (other than fixed or random effects in
the econometric estimation, see, e.g., Flaig and Stadler 1994, 1998, Kukuk and Stadler 2001,
2005) and (ii) it is not clear who answered the questionnaire and whether the person who did is
responsible for innovative activities. The latter disadvantage can obviously be avoided by more
costly interview techniques.
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All participants in the experiment are confronted with all experimental tasks. While
this within subject design is not entirely new, we add to the literature by focusing on
the decision paradigms not only of the IO literature (see, e.g., Schmutzler 2012) but
also of creativity research in psychology. The latter tries to explore how individuals
differ in creative problem solving, and how this may be interrelated with personality
traits (see, e.g., Furnham, Bachtiar 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our
experimental protocol and how we attempted to assess participants’ innovative ca-
pability, creativity, analytical skills, and personality. In section 3 we describe partic-
ipants’ behavior in the innovation games and then devote section 4 to the analysis
of the relation between innovative lab behavior on the one hand and creativity, an-
alytical skills and personality traits on the other with the help of correlation and
regression analyses. To avoid too many spurious task-to-task correlations, we rely on
self-constructed indices concerning innovative capabilities, creativity and analytical
skills. Section 5 summarizes and discusses our main findings.
2 Design and Experimental Procedures
Our experiment confronts participants with a set of tasks to measure their innovative
capability, creativity, and analytical skills. Further, we assessed their risk tolerance
along with some other personality traits. We first describe how we assessed our
central construct, participants’ innovative capabilities, with the help of a set of IO
games, and then how we measured participants’ creativity, analytical skills, risk
tolerance and personality traits.
2.1 Assessing Innovative Capabilities with the Help of Some
Innovation Games
To take into account the diversities of context in which innovation takes place we
included four different innovation games in our experiment (I1-I4): an R&D contest
(I1), one market entry model with horizontal innovation (I2) as well as one with
vertical innovation (I3), and a game of non-drastic process innovation (I4). When
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bringing the innovation games to the lab, we partly framed them and partly relied
on neutral formulations (i.e., we spoke of “taking a position” rather than “entering
a market”) in order to see whether framing matters.
The first game, I1, is an R&D contest game. Two firms i = 1, 2 invest in R&D
activities xi to win the innovation prize V . Using a simple contest success function
the expected firm profits are
πi =
xi
xi + xj + r
V − xi , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
If r > 0 is interpreted as interest rate, the static game corresponds to a dynamic
patent-race game with xi as a constant innovation hazard rate (see Loury (1979),
Nti 1997). We used the values V = 15 and r = 2 so that
πi =
15xi
xi + xj + 2
− xi , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j . (I1)
The symmetric equilibrium strategy of the firms in this game is x∗ = (7+
√
465)/8 ≈
3.57. In the game, participants were endowed with a sum of 5 ECU (Experimental
Currency Unit, where 1 ECU translated into 1 Euro). Participants could not enter
the game and keep the 5 ECU for themselves or they could invest 1, 2, 3 or 4 ECU
into the R&D game. We refrained from framing the game and did not speak of an
R&D contest, but instead asked participants if they wanted to take part in a “bet”.
The second game, I2, is a market entry game, based on the “Hotelling street”-like
product space [0, 1] where entering firms locate by choosing a product variety. We
adopt the two-stage location-then-price competition model of D’Aspremont, Gab-
szewicz and Thisse (1979) with quadratic transportation cost, modified by concen-
trating demand on the support x ∈ [1/4, 3/4] with density 2. Using the rather
general solution procedure as suggested by Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997),
the reduced-form profit functions, depending only on the locations x1 and x2, read
as
πi = (xj − xi)(1 + 2xi + 2xj)2/36 if xi ≤ xj
πi = (xi − xj)(5 − 2xi − 2xj)2/36 if xi > xj ,
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Figure 1: Screenshot I2
where i, j, = 1, 2, i 6= j. Multiplying the equations by 108 yields
π̃i = 3(xj − xi)(1 + 2xi + 2xj)2 if xi ≤ xj (I2)
π̃i = 3(xi − xj)(5 − 2xi − 2xj)2 if xi > xj .




) = (1/8, 7/8). In this market entry model
participants again were endowed with a sum of 5 ECU, which they could either keep
for themselves or invest in entering the market with a horizontal product innovation.
Entering the game meant investing the whole sum and having to choose a position
along the “Hotelling street”. We supported participants in their decision by asking
them to form expectations about the position their matching partner would possibly
take and then confronted them with a graph displaying their payoffs depending on
their own choice (see the screenshot displayed in Figure 1).
The third game, I3, is another market entry game. In contrast to I2 it is a model
of vertical differentiation. Entering firms locate by choosing qualities xi ∈ [0, 1]. We
adopt the two-stage quality-then-price competition model of Choi and Shin (1992)
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if xi > xj .




) = (4/7, 1). Participants were also endowed
with a sum of 5 ECU for this game which they could either keep for themselves or
invest in entering the market with a vertical innovation. Entering the game again
meant investing the whole sum and having to choose a position. Again, we supported
participants in their decision by asking them to form expectations about the position
their matching partner would take when investing and then confronted them with a
graph displaying their payoffs depending on their own choice. In contrast to game I2
with horizontal innovation, we deliberately refrained from framing but instead used
neutral language (“entering the game” instead of “entering the market”; “partner”
instead of “competitor”).
The fourth game, I4, is a two-stage R&D-then-price competition game of a non-
drastic process innovation, analogous to the R&D-then-quantity game of D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988). In the first stage, firms i = 1, 2 invest R&D expenditures x2i
and in the second stage they charge prices pi. The firms’ profits are
πi = [pi − (ci − xi)](1 − pi + pj) − x2i , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
Solving for the equilibrium prices in the second stage and substituting the resulting
expression in the profit function gives the reduced-form profit functions depending
only on x1 and x2 via
πi = [1 + (xi − xj)/3)]2 − x2i , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
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We multiply the equation by 20 to obtain
π̃i = 20[1 + (xi − xj)/3)]2 − 20x2i , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j . (I4)
The symmetric equilibrium strategy of the firms in this game is x∗ = 1/3. As in I2
and I3, in this process innovation game participants are endowed with a sum of 5
ECU, which they could either keep for themselves or invest in the game. Entering
the game meant investing the whole sum and having to choose a position. Again,
participants were asked them to form expectations about the position their matching
partner would possibly take. Then a graph displayed how their payoffs would vary
depending on their own choice, given their expectations. As in I1 and I3, we relied
on neutral wording.
2.2 Assessing Creativity, Analytical Skills, Risk Tolerance
and Personality Traits
Besides these four innovation games, we confronted participants with a set of further
tasks designed to measure their creativity (C1-C4) and analytical skills (L1-L5).
Concerning creativity, we confronted them with a set of tasks that each required
some kind of “stepping beyond” and leaving the traditional paths of thinking. In
task C2, for example, we asked participants to rearrange as few bullets as possible
in a pyramid such that it is turned upside down. Further, we asked them to name
as many four-letter words as possible in colloquial German or English containing
only the letters “o”, “p”, “s” and “t” in a given time frame (C4) and to draw different
geometrical objects each connecting four given points (C1).
Concerning participants’ analytical skills, among others, we built on standard IQ-
test tasks. Specifically, we included numerical-analytical tasks (e.g., in L1 we asked
participants to add up the numbers from 50 to 150 in a given time frame) as well as
visual-analytical (L3, L5) and verbal-analytical tasks (L4).
Following the experimental tasks, we added a post-experimental questionnaire in an
attempt to assess participants’ risk tolerance and personality traits. Regarding par-
ticipants’ risk tolerance, we (i) confronted them with a lottery question (see Holt and
Laury 2002) and (ii) asked them for a self-assessment with the respective question
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being taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). When assessing of
participants’ personality traits, we relied on a validated scale by Brandstätter (2010)
measuring participants’ self-control, anxiety, independence, tough-mindedness, and
extraversion.
2.3 Experimental Set-Up
Participants first received instructions that describe the general course of the exper-
iment. Then participants were confronted with the different I-, C-, and L-tasks in
random order. In the experiment, we included one more task where we tried to mea-
sure a combination of (verbal) creativity and innovative capabilities (the “k-task”).
The k-task was based on the German parlor game “Nobody is perfect” (English
equivalent: “Balderdash”) where participants are confronted with real words they
typically will not have heard of before. Players are asked to come up with defini-
tions and then can decide whether to “enter the market” with their definition or
not. “Entering the market” means that their definition is added to a list of potential
definitions of the word in question from which the others have to choose the one
they believe to be true. Points are awarded for every player who guessed that the
provided definition was the correct one. In this paper, we focus on the separate I-
and C-tasks, but will briefly report our results for the k-task which somehow seems
to combine creativity in problem solving and competition in innovation. When we
speak of innovation games, we exclude the k-tasks although they may capture more
adequately our intuition of innovative behavior.
After completion of the tasks, participants were asked to fill out the post-experimental
questionnaire. Besides a show-up fee of Euro 2.50, participants were paid for two
randomly chosen tasks and for one incentivized question in the questionnaire (the
lottery question to measure participants’ risk tolerance). The experiment was pro-
grammed in z-tree (see Fischbacher 2007). We ran 5 sessions with 30 participants
each. In the innovation games, we relied on a random strangers matching. Partici-
pants were told that in those tasks requiring interaction with another person, they
would be matched randomly with another participant and that it was very unlikely
that they would confront the same partner more than once. On average, one session
lasted 105 minutes and participants earned, on average, Euros 19.64.
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3 Descriptive Results from the Innovation Games
Since assessing participants’ innovative capabilities is central, we devote this section
to a detailed description of participants’ choices and performance in the four inno-
vation games. We start off with the participants’ decisions on entering the games,
the choices they took within the games and then report participants’ performance
in the innovation games as valued against the “market” in their respective session.
Starting off with the R&D contest game (I1), 66 percent of participants decided to
participate in the “bet”. On average, they invested 3.05 ECU. Minimum investment
was 1 ECU and maximum investment was 4 ECU. Compared to the equilibrium
solution of game I1, investment is a bit below the theoretical benchmark indicating
that participants on average were risk averse.
Concerning participants’ earnings in the R&D contest game, those deciding to enter
the game on average earned considerably more (8.92 ECU) than those who did not
(5 ECU). When assessing the innovation performance of entrants in I1, however, we
did not take their actual earnings resulting from a specific match (which would ren-
der the resulting performance measure more volatile) but rather assessed entrants’
performance “against the market”, i.e., by subsequently matching them with all the
other participants in the respective session and by taking the resulting average as
a performance measure. The resulting performance measure for entrants and non-
entrants lies between 5 and 9.49 with an average of 7.38. When only entrants are
included in the measure, it lies between 7.06 and 9.49, averaging 8.60.
In the market entry model with horizontal innovation (I2), 72 percent of participants
decided to enter the market. Of those entering the market, 26 percent chose an ex-
ante optimal position (1/8, 7/8). A strikingly large percentage of participants (32
percent) decided for the corner positions 0 and 1. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
chosen positions in I2 for the entering participants.
Concerning participants’ earnings, again, those entering the game earned on average
considerably more (12.34 ECU) than those who did not (5 ECU). With regards
to the performance of entrants in I2, we again assessed it “against the market” -
this time however only relying on those other participants in the same session who
also entered.2 The resulting performance measure for entrants and non-entrants lies
2 The horizontal differentiation game is not appropriate for analyzing the monopoly case since,
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Figure 2: Relative Frequencies of Chosen Positions (I2)
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Figure 3: Relative Frequencies of Chosen Positions (I3)
between 5 and 16.21 with an average of 9.77. When only entrants are considered,
the measure lies between 5.61 and 16.21, averaging 11.62.
In the market entry model with vertical innovation (I3), 75 percent chose to enter
the game (neutral framing). 36 percent of those entering chose the ex-ante optimal
position x = 1 and another 30 percent chose the inferior equilibrium position x =
4/7. Figure 4 shows the distribution of entrants’ chosen positions in I3.
Again, participants entering the game earned on average considerably more (12.56
ECU) than those who did not (5 ECU). When assessing the performance of entrants
in I3, we relied on the same procedure as in the innovation game with horizontal
differentiation (I2). The resulting performance measure for entrants and non-entrants
lies between 0 and 31.58 with an average of 11.42. When only entrants are included,
the measure lies between 0 and 31.58, averaging 13.52.
due to the inelastic market demand, the position of the monopolistic firm does not matter.
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Figure 4: Relative Frequencies of Chosen Positions (I4)
In the process-innovation game (I4), an even higher percentage of participants (81
percent) chose to enter the game. 60 percent of those chose the ex-ante optimal
position 1/3. Figure 5 shows the distribution of entrants’ chosen positions in I4.
Concerning earnings, again those entering earned on average considerably more
(17.74 ECU) than those who did not (5 ECU). When assessing the performance
of entrants in I4, we relied on the same procedure than in game I2 and I3. The re-
sulting performance measure for entrants and non-entrants lies between 5 and 19.32
with an average of 15.38. When only entrants are included, the measure lies between
11.23 and 19.32, averaging 17.76.
Altogether in all four innovation games at least two thirds of all participants have
invested and usually earned considerable more than those shying away from risk
and competition. In the following we will try to assess what distinguishes those who
invest from those who prefer to play save by considering their individual traits and
inclinations as elicited by the other tasks.
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4 What Drives Innovative Capability? - Exploratory Re-
sults
To test whether innovative capabilities are related to analytical skills, creativity and
personality, we relied on two basic measures of a participant’s innovative capability:
(i) a participant’s decision to enter the market in the innovation games I1-I4, as a
prerequisite for innovation (subsection 4.1) and (ii) a participant’s performance in
the innovation games - as assessed against the market of their respective session
(subsection 4.2).
4.1 Market Entry
Let us first have a look at participants’ entry decisions in the different innovation
games. The share of participants entering these games varied between 66 percent
in the R&D contest game (I1) and 81 percent in the process-innovation game (I4).
The average earnings of those participants entering the game in I2, I3 and I4 are
significantly above the earnings of those not entering. This suggests to explore the
determinants of participants’ entry decisions. More specifically we ask: is the entry
decision of a particular participant in any of the innovation games related to his
analytical skills, creativity, risk tolerance and personality traits?
Table 1 displays the correlations between entry in the different innovation games on
the one hand and participants’ creativity, analytical skills, risk tolerance and person-
ality traits (self-control, anxiety, independence, tough-mindedness and extraversion)
on the other. Concerning a participant’s analytical skills and creativity, we mea-
sured these by performance indices, i.e., by the sum of a participant’s standardized
earnings in the L-tasks as a measure of his analytical skills and by the sum of a
participant’s standardized earnings in the C-tasks as a measure for his creativity.
We find that entry into the process innovation game I4 is positively related to cre-
ativity (r=0.24), analytical skills (r=0.14), self-assessed risk-tolerance (r=0.14), inde-
pendence (r=0.16) and tough-mindedness (r=0.15). Market entry in the innovation
game with vertical differentiation (I3) is only related to self-assessed risk tolerance
(r=0.14), and market entry in I2 (horizontal differentiation) is positively related to
risk tolerance (self assessed: r=0.27; lottery question: r=0.15). Market entry in the
14












∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗: 10-percent-, 5-percent-, 1-percent-significance level
Table 1: Entry in I-Games: Correlations.
k-task that aimed at measuring a combination of innovative behavior and (verbal)
creativity, is neither related to participants’ creativity based on the different C-tasks,
nor to their analytical skills or risk tolerance. Concerning participants’ personality
traits, we find a slightly positive relation (r=0.15 on a 10-percent significance level)
between market entry in the k-game and extraversion, an aspect which often turns
out as relevant (see, e.g., Brandstätter and Güth 2002, Brandstätter and Königstein
2001).
In addition to separately looking at market entry in the four innovation games, we
created an additive index for the entry decisions in the four games. We find that
the latter is positively related to a participant’s creativity (r=0.17) and also to self-
assessed risk tolerance (r=0.25). Summing up, risk tolerance and creativity seem
to play the most important role in determining participants’ entry decisions in the
innovation games.




As explained in section 3, we assess participants’ innovation performance by look-
ing at their earnings in the respective game. Regarding entrants, however, we did
not take their actual earnings as a performance indicator, but rather assessed their
performance against the respective “market” in their session. Besides looking at a
participant’s performance in each different I-task, we also created a performance
index by summing up the (standardized) performance measures from the different
I-tasks.
I1 I2 I3 I4 I-Index
Creativity 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.24***
Analytical Skills 0.17** 0.16* 0.14*
Risk Tolerance
Lottery 0.15*







∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗: 10-percent-, 5-percent-, 1-percent-significance level
Table 2: Performance of all Participants in I-Games: Correlations.
Table 2 displays the correlations between the innovation performance measures (sep-
arate games and index) on the one hand and creativity, analytical skills, risk toler-
ance and personality traits on the other. Again, creativity and risk tolerance play the
most important role (with r=0.24 for the innovation performance index), followed
by analytical skills (r=0.14) and some of the personality traits. Concerning the lat-
ter, however, there does not seem to be a clear pattern with respect to the different
games. Performance in the k-task measuring a combination of innovative behavior
and (verbal) creativity, is - again - not related to participants’ creativity based on
the different C-tasks, analytical skills and risk tolerance. With the exception of self-
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control, where we find a positive relation of r=0.16 on a 10-percent significance level,
performance in the k-task is also unrelated to participants’ personality traits. Hence,
we conclude:
Result 2: Participants’ performance in the innovation games is positively related
to their creativity, risk tolerance and - to a lesser extent - to participants’ analytical
skills.












∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗: 10-percent-, 5-percent-, 1-percent-significance level
Table 3: Performance of Entrants in I-Games: Correlations.
If we only include those participants in the correlation analyses who entered the
market and actually played the innovation games and exclude those not entering by
keeping their initial endowment (see Table 3), we do no longer find a correlation
between innovation performance and risk tolerance. I.e., a higher risk tolerance in-
creases the probability that a participant will enter the innovation games, but once
somebody entered, innovation performance is no longer affected by risk tolerance.
Also, the relation between innovation performance on the one hand and creativity
or analytical skills on the other becomes weaker when the non-entrants are excluded
from the analysis - partly resulting from the reduced number of observations. Con-
cerning k-task performance, there are no changes compared to the analysis including
entrants and non-entrants.
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Result 3: Entrants’ performance in the innovation games is not related to their risk
tolerance.
Ia Ib IIa IIb
Creativity 0.22** 0.27*** 0.25* 0.24
Analytical Skills -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.22
Risk Tolerance
Lottery - 0.06 - -0.02
Self-assessment 0.07** - -0.02 -
Personality
Self-control -0.05* -0.07** -0.09** -0.08**
Anxiety -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06
Independence 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
Tough-Mindedness 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Extraversion -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06
Constant 0.68 0.78* 0.77 0.63
N 150 140 64 60
Prob>F 0.0002 0.0002 0.0044 0.0197
R2 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗: 10-percent-, 5-percent-, 1-percent-significance level
Table 4: Performance in I-Games: OLS-Regressions.
In a last step, we analyzed the differential impact of the potential drivers of innova-
tion performance by running a regression with the index of participants’ innovation
performance as the dependent variable and participants’ creativity, analytical skills,
risk tolerance (two different measures in two separate regressions) and personality
traits as explanatory variables. If we include all participants (i.e., those entering the
innovation games and those that did not, see Table 4, model Ia and Ib), we find
participants’ innovation performance to be significantly affected by their creativity,
self-control and self-assessed risk tolerance (when we use the lottery question, the
respective coefficient only slightly misses statistical significance with p = 0.107). If
we only include the entering participants in the regression (see Table 4, models IIa
and IIb), risk tolerance and innovation performance are no longer related (irrespec-
tive of the measure chosen). In the regression using the measure of self-assessed risk
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tolerance, however, creativity and self-control, remain influential.
Result 4: In a multivariate analysis, participants’ innovation performance is related
to their creativity, risk tolerance and self-control. Once participants decided to enter
the innovation games, however, their innovation performance is no longer affected
by their risk tolerance.
5 Summary and Discussion
Concerning the potential drivers of innovative capability, we find our measures of
innovation performance and market entry to be related to creativity, self-control
and risk tolerance. The latter, however, only influences participants’ entry decision
and not so much their performance as innovators. The capability to innovate thus
seems to be the willingness to engage in risk and competition which is enhanced by
individual creativity, self-control and risk tolerance.
Interestingly, a participant’s success in the innovation games and his analytical capa-
bilities are unrelated. This is surprising since analyzing the innovation games is quite
demanding. Apparently, intuitive behavior seems to dominate throughout so that
those capable of a more thorough analysis do not fare better. Of course, the graphs,
provided to participants when choosing their investments, might have compensated
for a lack in analytical skills.
Risk tolerance partly matters even when the innovation games are deterministic.
This renders the“risk question”of GSOEP more adequate than the narrowly defined
risk attitude, based on the curvature of utility curves.
Playing innovation games does not differ much from confronting the usual game-
theoretic paradigms of experimental economics and (social) psychology. Does enter-
ing and acting in innovation games really capture innovative potential? We included
the k-task which seems to better capture our intuition what innovation requires.
Since the findings for the k-task (entering the k-task is unrelated to analytical skills
and risk tolerance) mainly confirm those for the innovation games we are now more
confident of using innovation games. Their main disadvantage is only that they cap-
ture insufficiently the organizational and social skills of successful innovators which
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could be related to extraversion, a personality trait weakly related to entering the
k-task.
Our exploratory study suggests that the up-to now quite separate traditions of psy-
chological creativity research and of innovation economics might be combined to
promote a better understanding of innovation behavior in- and outside the lab.
However, the fact that the measured correlations between innovation performance
and creativity are not overwhelmingly large in size, hints at other factors apart from
creativity being crucial for innovation behavior. As shown by Glynn (1996), “orga-
nizational intelligence” might be of particular relevance here which unfortunately
is not or, at best, only poorly captured by our different tasks. In future research
one might therefore complement out battery of tasks by further ones, suitable for
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